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REFORMING FEDERAL VACANCIES
Justin C. Van Orsdol
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) is a
powerful but complicated and overlooked statute. At its
best, it is a pragmatic mechanism designed to fill
vacancies in executive agencies. But the complicated
nature of the FVRA has paved the way for Presidents to
manipulate its numerous loopholes in effect bypassing
Senate approval when appointing federal officers. These
loopholes raise several issues that threaten the existence
of the FVRA—including invalidation under the
Constitution. Further, regulated entities and citizens
should also be concerned about invalid rule
promulgation and enforcement actions, increased
procurement costs, lack of agency transparency,
increased risk of agency capture, and lack of judicial
remedies. But invalidation of the FVRA would create
chaos and disruption—negating a useful and necessary
mechanism—meant to keep administrative agencies
running when vacancies occur. Thus, this Note argues
that these loopholes should be closed to save the FVRA
from invalidation and offers potential legislative
solutions to accomplish this task.
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“Temporary solutions often become permanent problems.”1 —
Craig Bruce
I. INTRODUCTION
After 500 days of the Trump Administration, over 200 key
executive branch positions requiring presidential nomination and
Senate confirmation sit vacant.2 Which leads one to wonder, who is
running the show at the approximately 115 administrative
agencies?3 The answer: “acting officers.”4 Acting officers can fill
these vacancies on a “temporary” basis because of an obscure
statute,5 known as the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA
or the Act).6
According to Professor Anne Joseph O’Connell, the leading
authority on the FVRA, the Act serves three primary functions.7
First, it “identif[ies] a set of positions that can be filled
1 Phil Simon, ERP: It All Starts with an “E,” PHIL SIMON (June 11, 2013),
https://www.philsimon.com/blog/consulting/erp-it-all-starts-with-the-e/.
2 See John W. Schoen, After 500 Days, Hundreds of White House Jobs Remain Unfilled by
Trump
Administration,
CNBC
NEWS
(June
4,
2018,
5:17
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/04/after-500-days-dozens-of-white-house-jobs-remainunfilled.html (“[T]he White House ha[s] yet to put forward the names of candidates for 204 of
the 665 key positions that require Senate confirmation . . . .”).
3 The number of administrative agencies is unknown, but the Administrative Conference
of the United States estimates there are 115 agencies. See DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L.
SELIN, SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 14–15 (1st ed. 2012),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Sourcebook%202012%20FINAL_May%20
2013.pdf (“[T]here is no authoritative list of government agencies . . . . For example, FOIA.gov
lists 78[,] . . . [t]he United States Government Manual lists 96[, and] . . . USA.gov . . . lists
137 . . . .”).
4 See Lisa Desjardins, Hundreds of Top Government Jobs Under Trump Are Unfilled. So
Who’s Running Things?, PBS NEWS HOUR (Jan. 29, 2018, 6:20 PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/hundreds-of-top-government-jobs-under-trump-areunfilled-so-whos-running-things (reporting that temporary acting replacements fill federal
vacancies during presidential transitions).
5 Id.; see also VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44997, THE VACANCIES
ACT: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2018) (citing Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision,
139 F.3d 203, 209–10 (D.C. Cir. 1998)) (“In the case of . . . a vacancy, Congress has long
provided that individuals who were not appointed to that office may temporarily perform the
functions of that office.”).
6 See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–49c (2012) (outlining relevant United States Code
language for the FVRA).
7 See Jen Kirby, A Top Official at the Justice Department Is Resigning. The Federal
Vacancies Act has a Solution for That, VOX (Feb. 9, 2018, 7:57 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2018/1/30/16924764/trump-government-appointees-vacancies-act
(noting that Professor O’Connell is an expert on the FVRA and that “the [FVRA] basically
does three things”).
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temporarily.”8 Second, it identifies who can fill these vacancies.9
And third, it sets the time limitation on how long acting officers can
serve.10
The FVRA, however, has numerous loopholes that allow
Presidents to manipulate the filling of vacant positions.11 For
example, under certain conditions, an acting officer can serve for
much of a President’s term.12 And acting officers who serve past the
statutory time limitation face minimal consequences.13 Which leads
to the question, are these individuals truly “acting” officers?
Both Democratic and Republican Presidents either have violated
or have been accused of violating the FVRA.14 For instance, take the
concerns over President Clinton’s appointment of Bill Lann Lee as
Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights,15 President
Obama’s appointment of Vanita Gupta to the same office,16 Beth
Id.
See id. (“The second thing the [FVRA] does is say who can fill those positions.”).
10 See id. (“The last category of the [FVRA] is how long these acting officers can serve.”).
11 See, e.g., Brief for Morton Rosenburg as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 18,
34, NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 267 (mem) (2016) (No. 15-1251) (noting that
“Congress has strictly limited the President’s use of temporary [President and Senate
confirmed] officials” and that “[t]he manipulation of official appointments ha[s] long been one
of the . . . greatest grievances against executive power”).
12 See 5 U.S.C. § 3346(b) (2012) (explaining that while a nomination is pending an acting
officer may continue to serve until that nomination is rejected, withdrawn, or returned and
then 210 days thereafter); see also BRANNON, supra note 5, at 12 (“Section 3346 allows an
acting officer to serve while a nomination to that position ‘is pending in the Senate,’ regardless
of how long that nomination is pending.” (citing 5 U.S.C. § 3346(a)(2))).
13 See Matthew Kahn, Acting Accordingly: Acting Officers and the Federal Vacancies
Reform Act, LAWFARE BLOG (Nov. 27, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/actingaccordingly-acting-officers-and-federal-vacancies-reform-act (“The FVRA does not provide a
mechanism for removing officers who continue to act beyond their statutorily authorized
period” and while these actions may be void ab initio, parties need “standing to challenge an
action taken by a non-compliant officer.”).
14 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, https://www.gao.gov/legal/other-legalwork/federal-vacancies-reform-act (last visited Oct. 13, 2019) (listing FVRA violation letters
dating back to Sept. 15, 2000).
15 See Steven J. Duffield & James C. Ho, The Illegal Appointment of Bill Lann Lee, 2 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 335, 338 (1998) (“[T]he appointment of Bill Lann Lee was illegal. It violates
the Vacancies Act . . . .”); see also Ilya Shapiro & Thomas Berry, A New Way that Obama’s
Justice Department Breaks the Law, NAT’L. REV. (Dec. 19, 2016, 9:00 AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/12/justice-department-civil-rights-division-vanitagupta-illegally-appointed-federal-vacancies-reform-act/ (“Eighteen years ago, without the
Senate’s consent, Bill Clinton illegally appointed Bill Lann Lee to head the Justice
Department’s Civil Rights Division.”).
16 See Thomas Berry, The Illegal Tenure of Civil Rights Head Vanita Gupta (Jan. 19,
2017),
https://www.object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/legal_policy_bulletin_1.pdf
(“In April 2015 Vanita Gupta’s tenure as the acting assistant attorney general (AAG) for the
8
9
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Cobert as Acting Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Director,17
and Lafe Solomon as Acting General Counsel to the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB).18 More recently, a growing number of
accusations and lawsuits allege that the Trump Administration
violated the FVRA by appointing Mick Mulvaney as Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Acting Director,19 Robert
Wilkie as Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Acting Secretary,20
and Brian Steed as Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Acting
Director.21 Perhaps the recent Attorney General vacancy has finally
brought the FVRA at least close to public consciousness.22 Whatever

civil rights division expired.”); Shapiro & Berry, supra note 15 (“Vanita Gupta, the division’s
deputy head, has continued serving as acting chief, although, according to the law, her time
was up.”).
17 See Charles S. Clark, Cobert Ineligible to be Acting OPM Director, IG Says, GOV’T EXEC.
(Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.govexec.com/management/2016/02/cobert-ineligible-be-actingopm-director-ig-says/125994/ (reporting that Beth Cobert was deemed ineligible per the OPM
inspector general).
18 See NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 937 (2017) (holding that Solomon was
ineligible to serve as Acting General Counsel once he was nominated); Mark Theodore &
Joshua Fox, Supreme Court Holds that Lafe Solomon Improperly Served as NLRB General
Counsel,
PROSKAUER:
LAB.
REL.
UPDATE
(Mar.
21,
2017),
https://www.laborrelationsupdate.com/nlrb/supreme-court-holds-that-lafe-solomonimproperly-served-as-nlrb-general-counsel/ (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the “FVRA clearly prevents [Solomon] who has been nominated to fill a vacant office requiring
[p]residential appointment and Senate confirmation . . . from performing the duties of that
office in an acting capacity”).
19 See Alan S. Kaplinsky, How Long Can Mick Mulvaney Serve as CFPB Acting Director?,
BALLARD
SPAHR:
CONSUMER
FIN.
MONITOR
(Feb.
27,
2018),
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2018/02/27/how-long-can-mick-mulvaney-serveas-cfpb-acting-director/ (noting that Leandra English filed a lawsuit challenging Mick
Mulvaney’s appointment under 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(2)).
20 See Nicole Ogrysko, Facing a Lawsuit, VA Now a New Victim of Vacancy Act’s
Ambiguous Language, FED. NEWS NETWORK (May 1, 2018, 12:46 PM),
https://federalnewsnetwork.com/veterans-affairs/2018/05/facing-a-lawsuit-va-now-a-newvictim-of-vacancy-acts-ambiguous-language/amp/ (explaining that a non-profit organization
is suing the VA and new Acting Secretary Robert Wilkie for alleged FVRA violations).
21 See Scott Streater, Wanted, Once Again: BLM Deputy Director, E&E NEWS (Aug. 14,
2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060094077 (“Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke last year
appointed Brian Steed as acting BLM director but revised that title after complaints that his
appointment violated the [FVRA] . . . .”).
22 See Darren Samuelsohn & Caitlin Oprysko, Sessions Ousted, POLITICO (Nov. 17, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/07/jeff-sessions-out-as-attorney-general-972776
(reporting that President Trump’s temporary appointment of Matthew Whitaker utilizing the
FVRA could be subject to legal challenges). In fact, a lawsuit was filed challenging Whitaker’s
appointment on November 19, 2018. See Anushka Limaye, Document: Three Senators
Challenge Whitaker Appointment in D.C. Federal District Court, LAWFARE (Nov. 19, 2018),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/document-three-senators-challenge-whitaker-appointment-dcfederal-district-court.
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the cause of increased attention, the time is ripe to examine this
statute further.
Though myriad FVRA loopholes merit discussion,23 this Note
focuses on three of the most significant loopholes due to space
constraints: (1) self-created vacancies through terminations and
forced resignations; (2) subdelegation of “functions or duties”; and
(3) lack of meaningful enforcement provisions.
On the one hand, these loopholes raise several issues that
threaten the existence of the FVRA, including invalidation under
the U.S. Constitution, as Justice Thomas opined in his concurrence
in NLRB v. SW General, Inc.24 Specifically, the FVRA raises
separation-of-powers and Appointments Clause concerns.25
Moreover, regulated entities and citizens should be concerned about

23 See Brief for the Defendants-Appellees at 13–17, English v. Trump, No. 18-5007, 2018
WL 1043610 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 2018), ECF No. 1719366 (arguing that the FVRA is the
non-exclusive appointment mechanism when an agency statute exists); Thomas A. Berry,
S.W. General: The Court Reins in Unilateral Appointments, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 151, 170
(2017) (hypothesizing a situation in which a President could nominate someone who does not
meet the eligibility criteria in 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(2)–(3) by first nominating them to the
position of first assistant and then “immediately elevat[ing them to] . . . the acting officer
under subsection (a)(1)”); Christopher Fonzone & Joshua Geltzer, Can Trump Refuse to Fill
Key Jobs?, HILL (July 31, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/theadministration/344606-can-President-trump-refuse-to-fill-key-jobs (discussing whether the
President has to fill vacancies). Another possible loophole would allow the President to use
military officers to fill acting positions despite statutes that prohibit such appointments
because there are no consequences. See Joseph F. Barbano, Dual Office-Holding—Federal,
State and Municipal, 10 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 83, 87 (2014) (discussing statutory bans on dual
office holding); Stephen I. Vladeck, The White House Doctor and the Dual-Officeholding Ban,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/jacksondual-officeholding-ban/556781/ (“If there really is no remedy for violations of the ban, it is
hard to see how the statute could . . . stop someone . . . from filling . . . civilian positions
throughout the executive branch with active-duty military officers.”). There is also the
longstanding practice of appointing “advisors” or “czars” who are technically not officers but
often are top picks for officer positions and may exercise significant administrative power.
See Hannah Northey, No Senate Confirmation? No Problem, E&E NEWS (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060064115 (noting that the practice of utilizing advisors is
not new, but that advisors are “an arm’s length from the program and policy they could one
day shape”).
24 137 S. Ct. 929, 945 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that the FVRA violates
the Appointments Clause).
25 See id. at 948–49 (“We cannot cast aside the separation of powers . . . . [T]hat the Senate
voluntarily relinquished its advice-and-consent power in the FVRA does not make this
end-run around the Appointments Clause constitutional.”); see also Joshua L. Stayn, Note,
Vacant Reform: Why the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 Is Unconstitutional, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1511, 1513 (2001) (“The Act violates Article II by allowing the Senate unilaterally to
nominate and confirm or reject individuals whom the President has not actually
nominated . . . .”).
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invalid rule promulgation and enforcement actions,26 increased
procurement costs,27 lack of agency transparency,28 increased risk
of agency capture,29 and lack of judicial remedies.30 On the other
hand, invalidation of the FVRA would create chaos and disruption,
negating a useful and necessary mechanism meant to keep
administrative agencies running when vacancies occur.
To balance these concerns, this Note argues that these loopholes
should be closed in order to save the FVRA. First, this Note contends
that self-created vacancies via termination violate the
Appointments Clause and that, for clarity, the FVRA should be
amended to explicitly prohibit this practice. Second, this Note
advocates for greater restrictions on subdelegation of duties to
increase transparency in administrative agencies, fend off agency
capture, and place pressure on the President and Senate to appoint
permanent officers more quickly. Last, this Note argues that the
FVRA needs meaningful enforcement provisions to give teeth to the
FVRA by broadening standing and adding removal provisions to
deter future violations.
This Note proceeds as follows. Section II.A discusses the purpose
and history of the FVRA. Section II.B outlines the Act’s scope by
examining the application of relevant provisions. Section III.A
26 See Marquez Bros. Enters. v. NLRB, 650 F. App’x 25, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per curiam)
(denying petitioner’s claim of an allegedly invalid enforcement action because of failure to
exhaust an FVRA claim during the administrative proceedings).
27 See Chase Gunter, Does the Vacancies Act Really Matter?, FCW (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://fcw.com/articles/2018/04/02/vacancies-act-matter.aspx (“In the event an acting official
signed off on a contracting decision . . . a rival could cite a Vacancies Act violation as grounds
for protest.”).
28 See Kirby, supra note 7 (noting Professor O’Connell believes subdelegation “to be less
transparent” because unlike most officials who are listed on agency websites “certain tasks
that [have been] delegated . . . [are] hard to find”).
29 See Dahlia Lithwick & Mark Joseph Stern, A Legal Fight Donald Trump Should Win,
SLATE
(Nov.
27,
2017,
5:11
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/11/trump_should_win_t
he_battle_over_the_consumer_financial_protection_bureau.html (noting that by appointing
Mick Mulvaney as Acting Director of the CFPB he will “dismantle consumer protections,
and . . . claim[] . . . big businesses need more protection”). This, coupled with the accusation
that Mulvaney “tak[es] meetings with . . . companies who financed his past political
campaigns,” presents an opportunity for agency capture. See Lachlan Markay & Sam Stein,
Mick Mulvaney Met with Lobbyist Donors While at Trump White House, DAILY BEAST (Apr.
27, 2018, 12:51 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/mick-mulvaney-met-with-lobbyistdonors-while-at-trump-white-house.
30 See Gunter, supra note 27 (“Under the [FVRA], decisions made by an acting agency head
found to be serving in violation of the act could be potentially be voided . . . [but] the [FVRA’s]
language is vague and its precedent is limited.”).
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examines the three selected loopholes and analyzes their possible
ramifications if left uncorrected. Section III.B proposes solutions
and addresses potential questions that could be raised as a result.
Part IV concludes that without action the FVRA may be doomed,
converting a temporary solution into a permanent problem.
II. FEDERAL VACANCIES REFORM ACT OF 1998 BACKGROUND
The FVRA is a complicated and ambiguous statute that affects
multiple federal agencies. This Part first outlines the purpose and
history of the FVRA and its predecessor. It then turns to the scope
of the FVRA by explaining how its various provisions operate.
A. PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF THE FVRA

The Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires that
principal officers be appointed through nomination by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate.31 These positions are
colloquially referred to as President and Senate confirmed (PAS)
positions.32 Inevitably, vacancies in PAS positions occur, so
Congress enacted the FVRA as a mechanism to appoint acting
officers to temporarily perform PAS functions and duties.33
Under the original Vacancies Act, enacted in 1868, temporary
appointments were limited to 10 days, but this was later amended
in 1988 to 120 days.34 It also provided for automatic succession by
the “first assistant” to the officer.35 The Act went relatively
31 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[A]nd he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States . . . .”).
32 See Steven M. Swirsky & Laura C. Monaco, Supreme Court Rules That Former NLRB
Acting General Counsel Served in Violation of Federal Law, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN (Mar.
22, 2017), https://www.managementmemo.com/2017/03/22/supreme-court-rules-that-formernlrb-acting-general-counsel-served-in-violation-of-federal-law/ (“[I]ndividual[s] nominated by
the President and confirmed by the Senate [are referred to as] so-called ‘PAS’ positions.”
(internal parenthesis omitted)).
33 See Steve Vladeck, The Federal Vacancies Reform Act and the VA: A Study in
Uncertainty
and
Incompetence,
LAWFARE
(May
23,
2018,
11:25
AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/federal-vacancies-reform-act-and-va-study-uncertainty-andincompetence (explaining the purpose of the FVRA).
34 See Act of July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15 Stat. 168, 168 (amended 1891) (“[N]othing in this
act shall authorize the supplying as aforesaid a vacancy for a longer period than ten
days . . . .”); Pub. L. No. 100-398, 102 Stat. 985, 988 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 3348) (“A vacancy
caused by death or resignation may be filled temporarily . . . for not more than 120 days . . . .”).
35 See Duffield & Ho, supra note 15, at 348 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 3346 (1994)) (explaining that
an officer is automatically succeeded by their first assistant).
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unnoticed until President Clinton appointed Bill Lann Lee to Acting
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in 1997.36 Republicans
and scholars believed that because Lee served past the statutory
deadline his appointment was illegal, but nothing in the original
Vacancies Act voided his actions.37 In response, Congress enacted
the FVRA in an effort to “bring[] to an end a quarter century of
obfuscation,
bureaucratic
intransigence,
and
outright
circumvention.”38
As lofty as the FVRA drafters’ goals were, the resulting statute
is nothing more than a paper tiger.39 The FVRA was a step in the
right direction, but at its core the changes appear to be superficial—
with two notable exceptions. First, the FVRA added a third category
of eligible individuals who may serve as acting officers: senior
federal employees.40 Second, the FVRA depersonalized the term
“first assistant,” broadening the pool of eligible individuals by tying
the position to an office, rather than to an officer.41 This allows the
President to fill vacancies more easily because an office has a
permanent existence, whereas an officer may come and go—thereby
preventing an appointment due to their departure.
B. SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF THE FVRA

The FVRA retains the three primary functions of the original Act:
(1) to define which positions can be filled temporarily, (2) to define
who is eligible to fill vacancies, and (3) to set time limitations on

36 See Kirby, supra note 7 (noting that Bill Lann Lee served past the statutory deadline,
prompting the FVRA as a “compromise to allow the executive branch to staff these important
jobs, but put a limit on it to protect the Senate’s prerogative of confirmation in these
positions”); Linda Vester & Joe Johns, President Clinton Appoints Bill Lann Lee to the Justice
Department, NBC LEARN (Dec. 16, 1997), https://archives.nbclearn.com/portal/site/k12/flatview?cuecard=2448 (reporting that the appointment of Bill Lann Lee “caus[ed] an
outcry from Republicans because, as an acting chief, Lee d[id] not need Senate confirmation”).
37 See Duffield & Ho, supra note 15, at 362 (“Not only has Lee overstayed his welcome, he
never should have been invited to enter office in the first place.”); Kirby, supra note 7 (noting
that “there was nothing that voided his action”).
38 144 CONG. REC. S12810, S12824 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. Thompson).
39 See infra Section III.A.
40 See 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(3)(A)–(B) (2012) (“[T]he President (and only the President) may
direct an officer or employee of such Executive agency to perform the functions and duties of
the vacant office temporarily . . . .”).
41 144 CONG. REC. S12810, S12824 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. Thompson)
(“The term ‘first assistant to the office’ is incorporated into 5 U.S.C. Sec. 3345(a)(1), rather
than ‘first assistant to the officer.’ This change is made to ‘depersonalize’ the first assistant.”).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

9

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 [2019], Art. 7

306

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:297

acting appointments.42 Section 3345(a) limits the scope of the FVRA
to filling PAS positions within Executive agencies, except for those
within the Government Accountability Office.43 Additionally, it
establishes the applicable conditions under which a vacancy can be
filled temporarily to when a PAS officer “dies, resigns, or is
otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the office.”44
Further, § 3349c limits the reach of the FVRA by exempting “(1)
member[s] of a multi-member board that ‘governs an independent
establishment or Government corporation’; (2) a ‘commissioner of
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’; (3) a ‘member of the
Surface Transportation Board’; or (4) a federal judge serving in ‘a
court constituted under article I of the United States
Constitution.’”45
The FVRA defines three categories of individuals that can serve
as acting officers.46 The default replacement for a vacant PAS
position is the “first assistant” to the office.47 Despite some confusion
as to who qualifies as a first assistant, generally a statute or
regulation will define the position.48 Alternatively, the President
may direct any previously Senate-confirmed individual to fill a
vacant position.49 Last, the President may temporarily appoint any
grade GS-15 or above employee who worked for the agency for at
least ninety days prior to the vacancy,50 otherwise known as a
“senior careerist.”51
The FVRA also places time restrictions on the tenure of acting
officers.52 Generally, acting officers may serve for a 210-day period

42 See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text (discussing the primary functions of the
FVRA).
43 See 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a) (2012) (“If an officer of an Executive agency . . . other than the
Government Accountability Office . . . .”).
44 Id.
45 BRANNON, supra note 5, at 5 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 3349c).
46 5 U.S.C. § 3345 (2012).
47 Id. § 3345(a)(1); see BRANNON, supra note 5, at Summary (“As a default rule, the first
assistant to a position automatically becomes the acting officer.”).
48 See BRANNON, supra note 5, at 9 (“The term ‘first assistant’ . . . is not defined by the
[FVRA] and its meaning is not entirely clear. For many offices, a statute or regulation
explicitly designates an office to be the ‘first assistant’ . . . .”).
49 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(2) (2012).
50 Id. § 3345(a)(3)(A)–(B).
51 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82
S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 950 (2009) (discussing senior careerists).
52 5 U.S.C. § 3346 (2012).
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beginning on the date the vacancy occurs.53 If another individual is
nominated to fill the position permanently, the acting officer may
continue to serve past the 210-day tolling period.54 If the nominee is
rejected, withdraws, or is otherwise returned, another 210-day clock
begins.55 This process can occur twice before another acting officer
needs to be appointed.56 During a presidential transition, the time
limitation is extended to 300 days.57 Individuals, however, cannot
simultaneously be nominated and serve as an acting officer, but a
carve out exists for first assistants who served at least ninety days
prior to the vacancy.58 Theoretically then, a first assistant who
satisfies this condition could serve for an entire presidential term if
a nomination remained pending.
The FVRA only applies to nondelegable “functions or duties”
that a statute or regulation has exclusively assigned.59 But as
O’Connell notes, “most of the functions and duties are tasks that
can be assigned to someone else.”60 In circumstances where the
statutory time limit has expired, duties can also be assumed by
higher officials.61 When an acting officer takes an action outside of
the statutory time limit, the FVRA provides some protection for
regulated entities—at least textually—by rendering any
noncompliant act as “hav[ing] no force or effect.”62 Further,
53 See id. § 3346(a)(1) (“Except in the case of a vacancy caused by sickness . . . an acting
officer . . . may serve in the office for no longer than 210 days . . . .”).
54 Id. § 3346(a)(2).
55 See id. § 3346(b)(1) (“If the first nomination for the office is rejected . . . withdrawn, or
returned . . .the person may continue to serve as the acting officer for no more than 210 days
after . . . .”).
56 See id. § 3346(b)(2)(A) (“[T]he person serving as the acting officer may continue to serve
until the second nomination is confirmed . . . .”).
57 Id. § 3349a(b)(1)–(2).
58 See Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Temporary EPA Chief Could Keep Gig for Years Without Senate
Vote,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS
(July
16,
2018,
4:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-16/temporary-epa-chief-could-keep-gigfor-years-without-senate-vote (noting that former EPA Deputy Administrator Andrew
Wheeler was five days shy of the 90-day requirement to simultaneously serve as Acting
Administrator and as a nominee).
59 See 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a) (“If an officer of an Executive agency . . . whose appointment to
office is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice of the Senate, dies,
resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the office . . . .” (emphasis
added)); id. § 3348(a)(2)(A)(i)–(B)(i)(I) (“[T]he term ‘function or duty’ means any function or
duty of the applicable office that is established by statute . . . or is established by
regulation . . . .”).
60 Kirby, supra note 7.
61 See id. (“[F]or the functions and duties you can’t delegate down, you can delegate up.”).
62 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d)(1) (2012).
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noncompliant actions cannot be ratified.63 But while this sounds
good on paper, as I explain in Part III, these provisions provide little
to no protection in a practical sense.64
III. ANALYZING FVRA LOOPHOLES AND RECOMMENDED CHANGES
The FVRA is an important mechanism for filling vacant PAS
positions, but as discussed in Part I, many Presidents are either
confused by the Act,65 or plainly disregard it.66 This Part examines
three loopholes that both previous and the current administration
have exploited. It then provides recommendations to close these
loopholes and highlights questions that may be raised as a result of
their implementation.
A. SUMMARY OF LOOPHOLES AND POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS

Three major loopholes exist within the construct of the FVRA: (1)
self-created vacancies through terminations and forced resignation;
(2) subdelegations and the definition of “functions or duties”; and (3)
lack of meaningful enforcement provisions. Each loophole presents
its own challenges, either constitutionally or pragmatically.
1. Creating Vacancies Through Terminations and Forced
Resignations.
The text of the FVRA is unclear as to whether a self-created
vacancy, either by termination or forced resignation, is eligible to be
filled by an acting officer.67 If the Act allows this, it creates a
Id. § 3348(d)(2).
See infra Section III.A.3.
65 See Meredith Somers, Confusion over OPM IG Memo Symptom of Larger Political
Appointee
Bottleneck,
FED.
NEWS
RADIO
(Feb.
24,
2016,
5:35
AM),
https://federalnewsradio.com/opm/2016/02/confusion-over-opm-ig-memo-symptom-of-largerpolitical-appointee-bottleneck/ (noting a dispute over the proper interpretation of the FVRA
as it pertained to Beth Cobert).
66 See Steven Aftergood, Some “Acting” Officials Will Soon Lose Authority, FED’N OF AM.
SCIENTISTS (Nov. 6, 2017), https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2017/11/vacancies-act/ (noting that
“acting officials will no longer be able to carry out their duties” and “President Trump does
not appear to be concerned about the matter” because, according to Trump, “most of the
government positions awaiting confirmed nominees [are] superfluous”).
67 See Susan B. Cassidy et al., If Shulkin Didn’t Resign, Who Runs the VA Until a New
Secretary Is Confirmed? A Vacancies Act Puzzle, INSIDE GOV’T CONTRACTS (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.insidegovernmentcontracts.com/2018/04/if-shulkin-didnt-resign-who-runs-theva-until-a-new-secretary-is-confirmed-a-vacancies-act-puzzle/ (discussing how the “express
language of the Vacancies Act . . . does not permit the President to appoint an acting
63
64
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constitutional problem, potentially violating the Appointments
Clause and separation of powers. If the FVRA precludes this,
however, then the decisions of acting officers are likely void.
The FVRA drafters likely intended it to allow the filling of
self-created vacancies. During a floor debate, both Senators Thomas
and Byrd stated that vacancies created by terminations were an
example of § 3345(a)’s “otherwise unable to perform the functions
and duties of [such] office” language.68 In fact, this language was
specifically chosen “[t]o make the law cover all situations” because,
under Doolin Security Savings Bank v. Office of Thrift
Supervision,69 the original Vacancies Act’s language did not apply
to officers who were fired.70 But even the Trump Administration
appears to be “a bit gun-shy about relying” on a floor debate for
authority to create a vacancy by firing.71 Case in point, when
President Trump appointed Robert Wilkes to be the Acting VA
Secretary, “the White House began arguing . . . that [the former VA
secretary] had not been fired, but that instead, he resigned.”72
Justice Thomas recently illuminated the constitutional concerns
in SW General.73 In his concurrence, he stated that the FVRA
violates the Appointments Clause because it “authorizes the
President to appoint both inferior and principal officers without first
obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate.”74 To be sure,
replacement . . . created by a [p]residential firing” but “informal DOJ guidance . . . leaves
open the possibility”).
68 See GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF FEDERAL VACANCIES REFORM ACT OF 1998, at 61
(1999),
https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/guidance-application-federal-vacancies-reformact-1998 [hereinafter DOJ GUIDANCE ON FVRA] (noting that during a floor debate Senators
Thomas and Byrd stated that firing was an example of not being able to perform one’s duties
under 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)).
69 See 139 F.3d 203, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[I]t becomes clear that the [original Vacancies
Act] contemplates only the death, resignation, illness or absence of someone appointed to the
position by the President.” (emphasis added)), superseded by statute, Federal Vacancies
Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–277.
70 144 CONG. REC. S12810, S12823 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. Thompson).
71 See Vladeck, supra note 33 (noting that the “White House is at least outwardly wary of
the open question concerning [the FVRA’s] application in cases in which the vacancy is
created by firing” and that “[i]t might therefore be a bit gun-shy about relying on the FVRA”).
But cf. Resigned or Fired? Why the Controversy over Shulkin’s Departure Could Raise Big
Legal Questions, ADVISORY BD. (Apr. 3, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.advisory.com/dailybriefing/2018/04/03/shulkin (“O’Connell said she believes [the] FVRA does apply in instances
in which a cabinet secretary is fired, and there would be a number of hurdles to filing a
lawsuit . . . including differentiating between a forced resignation and firing.”).
72 Vladeck, supra note 33.
73 NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017).
74 Id. at 946 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Justice Thomas’s concerns were limited to aggrandizing the
President’s power in appointing principal officers, not inferior
officers.75 When I pressed Justice Thomas on my recommendation
of transforming “actings” into true inferior officers, as I discuss in
Section III.B, he was not receptive.76 Citing his concurrence in SW
General, he explained “[w]e cannot cast aside the separation of
powers and the Appointments Clause’s important check on
executive power for the sake of administrative convenience or
efficiency.”77 Other scholars agree with Justice Thomas’s underlying
premise but also posit that the FVRA is unconstitutional because it
“interfer[es] with the President’s exercise of his exclusive
constitutional power . . . by facilitating congressional encroachment
on the President’s long recognized prerogative to nominate and
control subordinate executive officers.”78 These scholars argue that
the FVRA “effectively empowers the Senate unilaterally” to
“designate whom the President selects to fill a particular office.”79
If the FVRA disallows self-created vacancies, it exchanges the
constitutional problem for a practical one. Any actions taken by
acting officers who have filled the position of a terminated PAS
officer would be void ab initio.80 The effect of this interpretation is
profound because it would invalidate any promulgated rules,
enforcement actions, or other decisions—creating a deluge of
potential litigation. And in some contexts, this would directly affect
taxpayers. For example, this could become problematic in federal
procurement, as many high-dollar value contracts require approval
from senior officials.81 A noncompliant acting officer’s approval of a
75 See id. (“Appointing inferior officers in this manner raises no constitutional
problems . . . . [But a]ppointing principal officers under the FVRA, however, raises grave
constitutional concerns because the Appointments Clause forbids the President to appoint
principal officers without the advice and consent of the Senate.”). The existence of a
constitutional problem with principal, but not inferior officers, appears to be due to the
Exceptions Clause. See infra note 128.
76 Interview with Clarence Thomas, Supreme Court Justice, in Athens, Ga. (Oct. 16, 2018).
77 SW General, 137 S. Ct. at 948 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 736 (1986)).
78 Stayn, supra note 25, at 1513.
79 Id. at 1527.
80 See 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d)(1) (2012) (“An action taken by any person who is
[noncompliant] . . . shall have no force or effect.”); see also BRANNON, supra note 5, at 3 (“The
Supreme Court has suggested that the [FVRA] renders any noncompliant actions ‘void ab
initio . . . .’”).
81 See,
e.g.,
AFFARS
5301.9001(f)(1)(i),
http://farsite.hill.af.mil/reghtml/regs/far2afmcfars/af_afmc/affars/5301.htm (noting that the
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contract award could spark a bid protest,82 costing not only time
(while the current contract is stayed)83 but also significant resources
both in litigation (or settlement) costs and in any re-procurement
effort.84 And taxpayer dollars would fund both the procurement and
resulting litigation.85
2. Subdelegation and the Definition of Functions or Duties.
The second major loophole involves subdelegation. The FVRA
allows acting officers to temporarily perform the functions and
duties of PAS officers.86 But the FVRA does not clearly define
functions or duties; rather it leaves the heavy lifting to other
statutes and regulations.87 Here is the rub: “[m]ost, and in many
cases all, [of] the responsibilities performed by a PAS officer will not
be exclusive, and the [FVRA] permits non-exclusive responsibilities
to be delegated to other appropriate officers and employees in the
agency.”88 At first, this may not seem problematic, but, as O’Connell
explains, this is actually a “big loophole”89 even if the FVRA does
not consider it to be one because the President can essentially play
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Contracting approves “noncompetitive contract actions
$500M or more and competitive contract actions valued at $1B or more”).
82 See Gunter, supra note 27 (“[If] an acting official signed off on a contracting
decision . . . a rival could cite a . . . [FVRA] violation as grounds for protest.”).
83 See Daniel Chudd & James Tucker, Stays of Contract Award and Performance
(Post-Award Protest Primer #6), GOV’T CONT. INSIGHTS (Aug. 16, 2017) (citing FAR
33.103(f)(1);
FAR
33.104(b)(1)),
http://govcon.mofo.com/post-award-protest-primerseries/stays-of-contract-award-and-performance-pre-award-protest-primer-6/ (“When a [bid]
protest is filed . . . before contract award . . . the stay prevents the contract award . . . [and]
[f]or protests filed . . . after contract award there is a stay of contract performance . . . .”).
84 See DAVID H. CARPENTER & MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45080,
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT BID PROTESTS: ANALYSIS OF LEGAL PROCESSES AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS 7 (2018) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3554(c)) (“If GAO concludes that an agency failed
to comply with . . . [a] regulation . . . the agency [may have to] pay the challenging party’s
attorneys’ fees and certain other costs associated with filing the protest.”).
85 See William D. Hartung, Here’s Where Your Tax Dollars for ‘Defense’ Are Really Going,
NATION (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/heres-where-your-tax-dollars-fordefense-are-really-going/ (discussing that in 2016 five defense firms alone “gobbled up nearly
$100 billion of your tax dollars”).
86 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345(a), 3348(a) (2012).
87 See id. § 3348(a)(1)–(2) (“[T]he term ‘action’ includes any agency action as defined under
section 551(13); and ‘function or duty’ means any function or duty of the applicable office that
is established by statute; . . . or is established by regulation.”). The Administrative Procedure
Act defines action as “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or
the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.” Id. § 551(13).
88 DOJ GUIDANCE ON FVRA, supra note 68, at 72.
89 See Kirby, supra note 7 (“Now, I should say there is a big loophole—I call it a loophole;
the Vacancies Act does not call it a loophole.”).
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a shell game, merely “reshuffl[ing] responsibilities and . . . leaving
those positions vacant.”90
This shell game comes at a cost and presents four problems:
(1) lack of transparency, (2) lack of political accountability,
(3) increased risk of agency capture, and (4) prolonged vacant
offices. As duties are delegated to lower level employees, agency
transparency becomes clouded as it becomes difficult to determine
who is performing which duties, even in the rare case that the
delegation is published.91 This leads to the second issue—lack of
political accountability. Without transparency, “political officials,
lobbyists, and interest groups” cannot adequately monitor or
“become aware of the real power brokers within an agency and
invest their resources accordingly.”92
Moreover, subdelegation exposes agencies to an increased risk of
capture. Under the normative agency capture definition, “agencies
consistently adopt regulatory policies favored by regulated
entities.”93 As duties are delegated, it becomes easier for an
administration to dissolve positions entirely and subcontract those
duties to private companies.94 And, given President Trump’s newest
Executive Order, it will be even easier to remove federal agency
employees.95 This is the ultimate form of agency capture because it
gives regulated entities the ability to transcend agency capture in
the normative sense. But by subdelegating, dissolving positions,
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 28.
92 Jennifer Nou, Subdelegating Powers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 502 (2017).
93 Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 64 (2015) (quoting Sidney A.
Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and Remediation, 17
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221, 224 (2012)).
94 See Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern (quoting David M. Walker,
The Future of Competitive Sourcing, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 299, 304 (2004)) (describing how the
GAO has increasingly delegated oversight power to private contractors even though “[w]ar
fighting, judicial, enforcement, regulatory, and policy-making functions should never be
privatized”), in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 313
(Jody Freeman & Martha Minnow eds., Harvard Univ. Press 2009). But cf. Barnett, supra
note 93, at 64 (arguing that “[h]aving various actors involved in administering a statute is
one way of seeking to insulate agencies from capture” and noting that “[i]nterpretive primacy
requires courts to defer to agency action only to the extent that it is founded on agency
expertise” (emphasis added)).
95 See Tom McCuin, Executive Order Makes It Easier to Fire Federal Employees,
CLEARANCE JOBS (May 30, 2018), https://news.clearancejobs.com/2018/05/30/executive-ordermakes-it-easier-to-fire-federal-employees/ (discussing how “government managers
increasingly turn to contractors for most things that are not ‘inherently governmental
functions’”).
90
91
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and then subcontracting these duties to private companies, the
administration is providing regulated entities the “authority to
perform enforcement and policymaking functions” directly.96
Last, subdelegation may lead to prolonged vacancies. If an
administration does not elect to outsource duties to private
companies, it may simply choose not to fill the position, especially if
it believes the position is superfluous.97 Vacancies, particularly “in
key executive agency positions[,] have several deleterious
consequences . . . includ[ing] agency inaction, confusion among
nonpolitical workers, and decreased agency accountability.”98 I
realize that prolonged vacancies may yield benefits like greater
involvement from line-level civil servants, which could in turn boost
morale.99 But the consensus among administrative law scholars is
that the costs of prolonged vacancies outweigh the benefits because
many of these benefits can be realized without delaying
appointments.100
3. Lack of Meaningful Enforcement Provisions.
The FVRA is all bark and no bite. As a precursory matter, § 3348
does not apply to all executive branch PAS officers, meaning some
actions that otherwise would be noncompliant would not be void ab
initio—they may not even be voidable.101 Consider a hypothetical:
an acting inspector general (IG), who serves past the statutory
deadline, authorizes an investigation into a Department of Justice
(DOJ) employee. The employee is terminated as a result of the
Verkuil, supra note 94, at 313.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
98 O’Connell, supra note 51, at 937–38.
99 See Nina A. Mendelson, The Uncertain Effects of Senate Confirmation Delays in the
Agencies, 64 DUKE L.J. 1571, 1601–02 (2015) (noting that if civil servants are responsive to
an administration’s goals there may be “greater engagement in policy issues” which “may
increase the civil servant’s job satisfaction”); see also O’Connell, supra note 51, at 946 (noting
that “[a]gency vacancies are not always costly . . . [and] may actually be desirable” because
they can lead to the “ability to select better appointees, potentially better performance from
frequent turnover, the need or preference for agency inaction . . . and the advantages of
temporary officials over proper appointees in certain contexts”).
100 See Mendelson, supra note 99, at 1602 (“These potential advantages could be
counterbalanced by other significant problems . . . .”); see also O’Connell, supra note 51, at
951 (“[A]lthough more research needs to be done, the risks . . . outweigh the potential
benefits . . . [a]nd many of the benefits may be obtainable without fostering delays in the
appointments process.”).
101 5 U.S.C. § 3348(e) (2012); see also BRANNON, supra note 5, at 5 (citing SW Gen., Inc. v.
NLRB, 796 F.3d 67, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2015)) (“[A] court might conclude . . . that even if these
officers violate the [FVRA], that law will not invalidate their actions.”).
96
97
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investigation. Normally, this investigation would be considered a
noncompliant act, but because the IG is exempted under
§ 3348(e)(3) the employee cannot challenge the IG’s authorization
on FVRA grounds.
Even where a noncompliant action is void, or voidable, the
primary enforcement mechanism of the FVRA stems from
administrative proceedings, litigation, and in defending
enforcement actions.102 But these proceedings come with their own
obstacles.103 First, the time and cost of litigation have to be
considered.104 Second, parties must have standing which would
likely be impossible when the acting officer has either taken
beneficial action,105 or not taken any action at all.106 Or if an acting
officer provided a general policy statement, there would be no action
to challenge because such statements do not bind the agency or
courts.107
102 See BRANNON, supra note 5, at 20 (“Arguably, the most direct means to enforce the
[FVRA] is through private suits in which courts may nullify noncompliant agency actions.”).
103 See Charles S. Clark, Time Is Running Out on Acting Officials’ Authority Under
Vacancies
Act,
GOV’T
EXEC.
(Nov.
7,
2017),
https://www.govexec.com/management/2017/11/time-running-out-acting-officials-authorityunder-vacancies-act/142368/ (discussing the slowness of the judicial process, issues with
standing, and rarity of Vacancy Act lawsuits).
104 See Gregory S. Wright et al., Insurance Coverage for CFPB Investigations and
Enforcement Actions, K&L GATES (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.klgates.com/insurancecoverage-for-cfpb-investigations-and-enforcement-actions-04-25-2013/ (“[C]ompanies often
incur substantial costs in defending an investigation, even prior to the commencement of any
enforcement proceeding or lawsuit.” (emphasis added)).
105 The difficulty would lie in proving the standing requirements: (1) injury in fact,
(2) causation, and (3) redressability. Consider a hypothetical: an acting officer promulgates a
(Pareto efficient) rule that is minimally beneficial to Corporation A but greatly beneficial to
that company’s direct competitor, Corporation B. The benefit is so great that Corporation B
will likely overtake Corporation A’s market share. It would be hard to argue that Corporation
A suffered a concrete and particularized injury, not a conjectural or hypothetical one—
Corporation A could likely not prove sufficient causation because their demise may not be
traceable back to the agency’s action. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61
(1992) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)) (“First the plaintiff must
have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”).
But if couched as an Appointments Clause claim, this may still be a viable injury. See Landry
v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[J]udicial review of an Appointments Clause
claim will proceed even where any possible injury is radically attenuated.”).
106 See Kirby, supra note 7 (noting that where an acting officer “didn’t do anything[, t]hen
you don’t have an action to void” and that it may “be hard to find an actual action, even though
[an acting officer] may be doing things, but it might not come in a particular concrete action”).
107 See Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 1987) (first citing Guardian
Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 666–67 (D.C. Cir.
1968); and then citing Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975)) (noting that
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More peculiar still is the absence of any provision in the FVRA to
remove unauthorized “actings.”108 Section 3349 requires the
Comptroller General to report officers who have served longer than
the 210-day limitation to the President and various congressional
committees,109 but these reports might as well be tossed into the
recycling bin because nothing in the letters require affirmative
action.110 Further, by failing to remove noncompliant acting officers
within the statutory time limit, the President may be violating the
Take Care Clause.111 If “[i]mplement[ing] the legislative mandate is
the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law,”112 then failure to
implement (i.e., failing to remove noncompliant acting officers) or
acting contra to the legislative mandate would be not faithfully
executing the law.113 To be sure, the Take Care Clause has been used
as justification “[t]o authorize the President to act outside of direct
statutory authorization when needed to protect important
government functions.”114 And in the rare circumstance that a PAS
position had nondelegable duties that would have drastic effects on
the nation (i.e., national emergencies), perhaps this argument

general policy statements do not establish binding norms and the agency is free to exercise
its discretion); see also Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts,
116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2017) (“[P]olicy statements . . . and other guidelines . . . ‘lack the
force of law.’” (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000))).
108 See BRANNON, supra note 5, at 20 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 3349(b)) (“[T]he Vacancies Act does
not contemplate a means of removing any noncompliant acting officers from office.”).
109 See 5 U.S.C. § 3349(b) (2012) (“If the Comptroller General of the United States makes a
determination that an officer is serving longer than the 210-day period . . . [they] shall report
such determination immediately to . . . the Senate and House of Representatives; [and] the
President . . . .”).
110 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-329853, VIOLATION OF THE TIME LIMIT
IMPOSED BY THE FEDERAL VACANCIES REFORM ACT OF 1998—COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 1–2 (2018). Additionally, there is no requirement as to when these
letters must be sent. See Chase Gunter, GAO: SSA Chief Has Been ‘Acting’ Too Long, FCW
(Mar. 9, 2018), https://fcw.com/articles/2018/03/09/ssa-gao-vacancies-act.aspx (noting that it
took four months for the GAO to notify the President and Congress that the Acting
Commissioner of the SSA had served past the statutory time limit).
111 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed . . . .”).
112 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986).
113 See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L.
REV. 1835, 1848 (2016) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952))
(“The Supreme Court has also invoked the Take Care Clause as the textual source of the
President’s duty to abide by . . . the laws enacted by Congress—that is, as the instantiation
of the President’s duty to respect legislative supremacy and not to act contra legem.”).
114 James Rathz, Does Anyone Know What the “Take Care Clause” Means?, REG. REV. (Jan.
28, 2016), https://www.theregreview.org/2016/01/28/rathz-take-care-clause/.
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would have merit.115 But overall, this argument fails because the
President cannot “claim[] an inherent power to fill vacancies,”
contravening the FVRA.116 After all, “the Framers intended to
provide a check on the power of the Executive” because they feared
that a “President would [ab]use the power of appointment.”117
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CLOSING THE FVRA LOOPHOLES

What then can be done to close the loopholes? This Section
proposes solutions to remedy the FVRA loopholes discussed in
Section III.A and raises additional concerns that may arise if these
solutions were implemented.
1. Clarifying and Prioritizing the Types of Vacancies Covered by
the FVRA.
Given the power that acting officials wield,118 combined with the
lack of removal provisions, allowing the President unilateral
authority to create vacancies through firing circumvents the power
of Congress and the Appointments Clause. But contrary to Justice
Thomas and other legal scholars,119 this should not be the FVRA’s
death knell—and with some clarification and prioritization—the
Act can be saved.
Scholars who argue that the FVRA is unconstitutional because it
gives the Senate too much control over limiting whom the President

115 See HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-505 GOV, NATIONAL EMERGENCY
POWERS 4 (2007) (“[T]he President . . . may exercise certain powers in the event that the
continued existence of the nation is threatened by crisis, exigency, or emergency
circumstances.”).
116 Brannon P. Denning, Article II, the Vacancies Act and the Appointment of “Acting”
Executive Branch Officials, 76 WASH. U. L. REV. 1039, 1042 (1998).
117 Id. at 1041 (citing the DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 12–13 (U.S. 1776)).
118 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Staffing Federal Agencies: Lessons From 1981–2016,
BROOKINGS (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/staffing-federal-agencieslessons-from-1981-2016/ [hereinafter O’Connell Staffing] (noting these powers include:
issuing binding regulation, writing influential guidance documents, making final calls on
major adjudications, regulating rates for mail, running embassies, and launching
investigations into presidential candidates). This power even extends internationally. See
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 906 (2014)
(noting that the “U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations” is covered by the
FVRA).
119 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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can have fill a vacancy120 confuse the lessons learned in Myers v.
United States.121 In Myers, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that
Congress can “prescrib[e] . . . reasonable and relevant qualifications
and rules of eligibility of appointees,”122 if “the qualifications do not
so limit selection and so trench upon executive choice as to be in
effect legislative designation.”123
Section 3345 falls well within the Myers framework. First, it
merely prescribes qualifications, that is, eligible acting officers must
either be: a first assistant, previously confirmed by the Senate, or a
GS-15 employee. Second, the President not only has a choice
between any of these categories, but within each category there are
several people from whom she or he can select. I recognize that
among first assistants the choice may be limited (though broadened
by depersonalizing the term),124 but among previous
Senate-approved officials there are approximately 1,000 people
from whom to choose,125 and of the 1.8 million full-time federal
employees some 77,400 (4.3%) are GS-15s.126 This hardly limits the
President’s selection to the point of legislative designation.
This still leaves Justice Thomas’s contention that the FVRA
gives the President unilateral appointment authority in violation of
the Appointments Clause. One possible solution here would be to
avoid the constitutional issue altogether and distinguish acting
officers as inferior officers.127 Inferior officers can be appointed by
the President alone if Congress elects to use the Exceptions

120 See Stayn, supra note 25, at 1513 (“The Act violates Article II by allowing the Senate
unilaterally to nominate and confirm or reject individuals whom the President has not
actually nominated . . . .”).
121 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
122 Id. at 129.
123 Id. at 128.
124 See supra Section II.A.
125 See Senate Confirmation FAQ, SLATE (Jan. 16, 2001, 11:57 AM), https://slate.com/newsand-politics/2001/01/senate-confirmation-faq.html (noting that about 1,000 people require
Senate approval). Granted, not all of these positions are filled, but the choice is far from
constrained.
126 See
Federal
Workforce,
PARTNERSHIP
FOR
PUB.
SERV.
(2014),
https://ourpublicservice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/abd589d0e0dcd9336101e81858a0d2f6-1399994024.pdf (noting that
as of 2013 there were 1.8 million full-time federal employees, and 4.3% of those employees
were categorized as GS-15).
127 See Berry, supra note 23, at 176 (“One possible solution is that the time limits the FVRA
places on acting service might ‘downgrade’ principal officers to inferior officers.”).
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Clause.128 The theory is that an “acting [officer] who knows that by
law [she or he] may only serve while someone else is nominated to
replace [her or him]” is therefore more constrained so as to make
them an inferior officer.129 But as Justice Thomas pointed out in SW
General,130 this constraint is artificial because acting officers can
serve for most of a President’s term.131
To quash constitutional concerns, the FVRA should be amended
to strictly prohibit the filling of self-created vacancies caused by
terminations, thereby forcing the President to seriously
contemplate removing officials—knowing that she or he could not
simply replace them with an acting officer. This prohibition,
combined with my other proposals, would increase continuity in the
Executive Branch by reducing the number of vacancies.
Additionally, it would provide a cascade of other benefits, such as a
reduction in subdelegation of tasks, increased transparency, and
increased political accountability. Admittedly, this proposal does
not fully resolve Justice Thomas’s formalistic opposition to acting
officers stepping into the shoes of principal officers, but it does
partially curtail circumvention of the Appointments Clause and
preserves the spirit of the FVRA, which is a functional
compromise.132 To be sure, only Justice Thomas has proffered such
a formalistic view on the FVRA, but with the additions of Justices
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, it is possible more Justices could join in
his sentiment.133 Should Justice Thomas’s position prevail, not all

128 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[B]ut the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments.”).
129 Berry, supra note 23, at 176; see also infra note 146.
130 See NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 946 n.1 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I
do not think the structural protections of the Appointments Clause can be avoided based on
such trivial distinctions.”).
131 See 144 CONG. REC. S12,823 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. Thompson)
(noting that § 3346(a) creates an unlimited time limit exception for acting officers filling a
vacancy due to sickness); see also supra Part I.
132 See Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Court Limits “Acting” Appointments to Fill Vacancies,
SCOTUS BLOG (Mar. 22, 2017, 6:34 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/opinion-analysiscourt-limits-acting-appointments-fill-vacancies/ (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court views
the text of the FVRA as a compromise between the legislature and the President); see also
Kirby, supra note 7 (“And so what the 1998 Vacancies Act did was try to broker a compromise
to allow the executive branch to staff these important jobs, but put a limit on it to protect the
Senate’s prerogative of confirmation in these positions.”).
133 See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
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would be lost because § 3345(a)(2) allows the President to appoint
acting officers who have already been confirmed by the Senate.134
Related to terminations is the issue of vacancies created through
forced resignations, and—due to complexity—these should remain
viable vacancies under the FVRA. Some advocate that forced
resignations, or constructive dismissals, are really just
terminations by another name because they are involuntary.135 If
this is true, then, under my proposal, such resignations would
preclude the President from filling the subsequent vacancy. But
constructive dismissal is difficult to prove136 and is generally only a
viable cause of action if an employee was coerced to resign due to
harassment or discrimination.137 And unlike in the typical
employer-employee context, forced resignations for PAS officers are
more likely to stem from political pressures that arise from changes
in administrations and disagreements over policy matters rather
than claims of harassment and discrimination.138 Moreover, it is
often difficult to distinguish between voluntary and truly forced
resignations.139 In the context of PAS officers, forced resignations
134 See Berry, supra note 23, at 177 (discussing that § 3345(a)(2) “allows the [P]resident to
unilaterally grant a new title (and with it, new powers and duties) to someone who has
already been confirmed by the Senate”).
135 See Daniel Lublin, Some Resignations Are Terminations in Disguise, GLOBE & MAIL
(Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/careers/leadershiplab/some-resignations-are-terminations-in-disguise/article34346477/ (“Some resignations are
actually terminations in disguise.”); Andrew Restuccia, Did Shulkin Get Fired or Resign? This
is
Why
it
Matters,
POLITICO
(Mar.
31,
2018,
10:50
AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/31/did-shulkin-get-fired-or-resign-veterans-492877
(“Washington often wraps firings in the verbal cloak of a resignation . . . .”).
136 See Crystal L. Norrick, Note, Eliminating the Intent Requirement in Constructive
Discharge Cases: Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1813, 1813–
14 (2006) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to answer whether one must prove
employer intent or what an “official act” by an employer is); Cathy Shuck, Comment, That’s
It, I Quit: Returning to First Principles in Constructive Discharge Doctrine, 23 BERKLEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 401, 413–15 (2002) (discussing the unresolved circuit split on proving
employer intent).
137 See Shuck, supra note 136, at 402 (“[A]nti-discrimination laws do not literally prohibit
employers from coercing an employee into quitting by making the employee’s work life
miserable[, but b]ecause such conduct would clearly violate the intent of the statutes, courts
have developed the doctrine of constructive discharge.”).
138 See Jan Diehm & Sam Petulla, Who Has Left Trump’s Administration and Orbit?, CNN
(July 6, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2017/08/politics/trump-admin-departurestrnd/ (noting that Obama appointees resigned shortly after President Trump took office and
that appointees such as John Feeley, former U.S. Ambassador to Panama, resigned due to
“differences with the Trump administration”).
139 See id. (listing several people, such as Michael Short, former Assistant Press Secretary,
who resigned but under unclear circumstances).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

23

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 [2019], Art. 7

320

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:297

over policy matters and presidential transitions, while greatly
pressured, are not involuntary like in a discrimination or
harassment context. Mere political pressure does not transform a
resignation into a “termination in disguise” because PAS officers
have the option to stand their ground and force termination.140
Therefore, these “forced resignations” are essentially voluntary
resignations. And because they are resignations, they are
permissible under § 3345(a).
But like a game of Whac-a-Mole, with every solution up pops
another problem. By removing the President’s ability to fill a
self-created vacancy and by restricting the subdelegation of duties,
an opportunity arises for a President to hinder the administrative
state by simply not nominating a permanent replacement.141 But
the FVRA already has a built-in release valve for such a scenario:
recall the default option is that the first assistant to the office steps
in when a vacancy occurs.142 This means that if the President does
not act then the first assistant automatically steps in.
The real problem ensues at the end of the statutory tolling
period. The FVRA could be amended to impose a consequence when
a President refuses to nominate a permanent replacement pursuant
to the deadline in § 3346. The amendment would establish an
additional timeline for a President to submit a nomination, but
failure to nominate a permanent nominee within the prescribed
timeline would result in a department head appointing a senior
careerist (GS-15),143 making him or her an interim officer.144 This
140 See Kara Scannell, Former DOJ Chief Sally Yates on Being Fired by Trump, FIN. TIMES
(Aug.
11,
2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/a3de8f4c-7b8d-11e7-ab01-a13271d1ee9c
(discussing former U.S. Attorney General Sally Yates’s decision not to resign in the face of
President Trump’s travel ban).
141 See O’Connell, supra note 51, at 938–43 (“The absence of appointed agency leaders
fosters agency inaction. If agencies are missing important managers, they will make fewer
policy decisions.”).
142 See 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1) (1998) (“[T]he first assistant to the office of such officer shall
perform the functions and duties of the office . . . .”).
143 For instance, assume there is a vacancy for Assistant Secretary for Acquisition at the
Department of the Air Force. The Under Secretary for the Air Force would then appoint a
GS-15 to be the interim Assistant Secretary for Acquisition. See CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS &
MICHAEL GREENE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30959, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEE POSITIONS
REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION AND COMMITTEES HANDLING NOMINATIONS 7 (2017)
(listing the hierarchy of positions within the Department of the Air Force).
144 See Trump Can’t Run the Government with Temps, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 29, 2017, 8:00
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-12-29/trump-can-t-run-the-governmentwith-temps (suggesting that for PAS positions created by Congressional statute a career civil
servant should fill the position after the deadline passes).
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would operate similarly to vacancies in U.S. Attorney positions.145
But unlike acting officers appointed during the statutory 210-day
tolling period, these interim officers would be true inferior officers
with limited duties, strict tenure periods. Further, they would be
tasked with keeping the agency in a state of status quo.146 Under an
interim officer’s purview, the agency could continue to promulgate
any rules currently undergoing notice and comment at the time the
vacancy occurred, as well as pursue enforcement actions under
current regulations. But the agency would be prohibited from
rescinding or creating new rules, and they could not suspend
enforcement actions altogether. They would also be shielded with
“for cause” removal, where possible.147 To further entice the
President to make speedier nominations, less deference could be
given to decisions made under these interim officers because they
are generally “less [politically] accountable to both the White House
and Congress than normal appointees.”148
This proposal creates several benefits. First, it forces the
President to nominate permanent officers by encumbering his or her
ability to hinder the administrative state simply from inaction.
Rather, it would take affirmative presidential action to nominate a
permanent individual to make significant changes at an agency
level—a decision which entails some breadth of political
accountability. And, because many PAS positions are “created by
congressional statute,” this proposal would likewise encourage the
President to “work with Congress to identify which high-level jobs
are no longer necessary,”149 rather than give the President carte
blanche authority to decide this unilaterally. Moreover, the
President would not be left without tools at his disposal to control

145 See Kirby, supra note 7 (explaining that for U.S. Attorney vacancies exceeding the
120-day tolling period the “district court in which the US attorney position is located can
choose an interim US attorney until a person is confirmed”).
146 See United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 344 (1898) (“Because the [acting] officer is
charged with the performance of the duty of the [PAS officer] for a limited time, and under
special and temporary conditions, he is not thereby transformed into the superior and
permanent official.”).
147 This would not be possible for positions where the interim officer would enjoy dual “for
cause” protection. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
492 (2010) (“We hold that the dual for-cause limitations on the removal of Board members
contravene the Constitution’s separation of powers.”).
148 O’Connell, supra note 51, at 944.
149 Trump Can’t Run the Government with Temps, supra note 144.
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the administrative state, such as initiating hiring freezes, pay
freezes, and sequestration.150
A second, perhaps hidden benefit of my proposal is that it keeps
executive agencies running during prolonged vacancies in arguably
better fashion than they would under traditionally appointed PAS
officers. Senior careerists generally have more expertise because, as
civil servants,151 they have worked their way up through an agency
over the span of several years, gaining tactical experience,
operational competence, and strategic vision.152
2. Restricting Subdelegations and Defining “Functions or Duties.”
The second proposal is to further define and restrict the
subdelegation of functions and duties. Section 3348 of FVRA should
be amended to clarify and define additional functions and duties
that cannot be subdelegated aside from those established by other
statutes and regulations.
First, “non-official acts,” such as advisory letters and general
policy statements should be classified as functions and duties and
restricted from subdelegation. Recall that noncompliant acting
officers can have a profound effect on regulated entities without
taking action with the force of law.153 This change would extend the
void ab initio doctrine to “non-official acts” carried out by
noncompliant acting officers and alleviate some standing issues

150 See Carten Cordell, How the Obama Administration Shaped the Federal Workforce, FED.
TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.federaltimes.com/management/2016/12/05/how-theobama-administration-shaped-the-federal-workforce/ (discussing sequestration and pay
freezes under President Obama); Brian Naylor, State of Federal Workforce: Low, NPR (Jan.
28, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/28/581118791/state-of-the-federal-workforce-low
(discussing President Trump’s hiring freeze during the first three months of his
administration).
151 See Kirby, supra note 7 (“If you’re someone who’s a proponent of expertise in these
critical positions, you’re going to favor actings drawn from that third category of senior
careerist.”).
152 See, e.g., Levels of Air Force Leadership, CURTIS E. LEMAY CTR. (Aug. 8, 2015),
https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/Volume_2/V2-D10-Levels-Leadership.pdf
(discussing the Air Force leadership structure model). Most agencies utilize an annual review
process which tracks employee competence and leadership abilities over time. See GEN.
SERVS. ADMIN., HRM 9430.2, GSA ASSOCIATE (EMPLOYEE) PERFORMANCE PLAN AND
APPRAISAL SYSTEM 8–9 (2017) (noting that GSA employees are annually evaluated based on
critical elements including: leadership, organizational performance, and work assignments).
153 See supra Section.III.A.3.
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because now there would be an actual action (with an accompanying
FVRA violation) to challenge.154
Second, any private outsourcing decisions should be considered a
“function or duty” and restricted from subdelegation, as this would
help fend off agency-capture concerns.155 This threat may seem
distant as private outsourcing is currently under a moratorium,156
but such a ban could easily be lifted, allowing private contractors to
once again pierce the veil of government functions or duties.157
While agency capture cannot be completely thwarted by this
proposal, it would limit the effectiveness of this form of capture
should Congress lift the ban.
Additionally, restricting subdelegation would increase agency
transparency and political accountability. Rather than burying
duties behind a smokescreen, citizens and regulated entities would
be better informed and equipped to understand who the key decision
makers are at respective agencies. In turn, this creates amplified
political accountability158 and empowers interested parties to apply
pressure on these officials for actions they disfavor by requesting
hearings or investigations from Congress or encouraging favorable
actions by petitioning Congress for increased funding to carry out
additional or related actions.159
154 See, e.g., Stand Up for California! v. United States DOI, 298 F. Supp. 3d 136, 143 (D.D.C.
2018) (holding no FVRA violation existed because without “affirmative language precluding
delegation . . . [o]n the regulation’s plain text, then, delegation by the Secretary to a
subordinate . . . seems ‘presumptively permissible’” (quoting U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359
F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004))); Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kempthorne, 587 F. Supp. 2d
389, 420 (D. Conn. 2008) (denying plaintiff’s subdelegation FVRA challenge because
acknowledgement decisions were not “exclusively” assigned to the Secretary of the Interior
and therefore could be delegated).
155 See discussion supra Section.III.A.2.
156 See Charles S. Clark, House Rejects Outsourcing of Federal Jobs in Vote to Block Revival
of
Circular
A-76,
GOV’T
EXEC.
(July
28,
2017),
https://www.govexec.com/contracting/2017/07/house-rejects-outsourcing-federal-jobs-voteblock-revival-circular-76/139829/ (discussing the seven-year moratorium on A-76 studies
which outsource government jobs to private contractors).
157 See Frederico Bartels, Renewing OMB Circular A-76 Competitions: Savings and Greater
Effectiveness,
HERITAGE
FOUND.
(Aug.
2,
2018),
https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/renewing-omb-circular-76-competitions-savingsand-greater-effectiveness (arguing that A-76 studies should be reimplemented).
158 See Nou, supra note 92, at 502 (citing Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible
Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 903 (2007)) (“[T]ransparency enables monitors . . . to become
aware of the real power brokers within an agency and invest their resources accordingly.”).
159 This is now even easier with the advent of sites like Change.org. See Joseph Marks,
Now You Can Petition Some Members of Congress Directly, NEXTGOV (Oct. 23, 2013),
https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2013/10/online-petition-site-offers-lawmakers-
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Others have suggested less severe alternatives, such as publicly
memorializing subdelegations.160 But this solution presents its own
challenges and would likely do little to solve the transparency
problem. For example, it would impose increased strain and cost on
agencies to update and maintain a database accessible to the public.
And with more data comes more room for error and increased
difficulty in tracking who the true decision makers are. Indeed, such
a system already exists in the federal procurement arena161 and is
not only costly to the taxpayer162 but the information is not always
correct.163 Restricting subdelegation of functions and duties may be
strong medicine, but it is cheaper to implement and more effective
at increasing agency transparency and political accountability.
Plus, duties that cannot be subdelegated can always be assumed by
a higher authority.164
3. Giving the FVRA Enforcement Teeth.
Of course, my proposals are futile without adding meaningful
enforcement provisions. As I discuss in Section III.A.3, the primary
FVRA enforcement techniques are through administrative
proceedings and litigation. But more prophylactic measures, by way
of removal provisions, are needed to curb litigation and save judicial
resources. Therefore, the FVRA needs to be given teeth, in what I
call the “FVRA with bite.”

official-pages/72440/ (discussing the benefits of increased transparency and ability to
communicate with Congress directly through Change.org).
160 See Nou, supra note 92, at 502 (“Another strategy agency heads can use to make their
subdelegations more credible is to make them more transparent . . . [by] publicly
memorialz[ing them].”).
161 See,
e.g.,
FEDERAL
PROCUREMENT
DATA
SYSTEM,
https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/index.php/en/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
162 See Eleni Martin, GSA Awards $24 Million Contract to Global Computer Enterprises for
Federal Procurement Data System Next Generation, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN. (reporting that
in 2003 the government awarded a seven-year contract valued at approximately $24.3 million
dollars to develop and operate FPDS).
163 See MOSHE SCHWARTZ ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44010, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS:
HOW AND WHERE DOD SPENDS ITS CONTRACTING DOLLARS 1 (2018) (“Decisionmakers should
be cautious when using . . . data from FPDS . . . [because i]n some cases, the data itself may
not be reliable. In some instances, a query for particular data may return differing results,
depending on the parameters and timing.”).
164 See supra text accompanying note 61.
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a. Removing Incentives to Stay Past the Statutory Tolling Period.
The first enforcement fang aims at disincentivizing acting
officers from staying past the statutory tolling period. One
suggestion is to ban acting officers from drawing a salary past the
tolling period.165 This may cause some acting officers to step down,
assuming they would actually feel the pecuniary sting. And if it does
not entice them to do so, it would at least result in a monthly savings
to taxpayers of $12,816 to $17,558 per officer, per month, for each
noncompliant acting officer.166
But at salary ranges of $153,800 to $210,700 per annum,167 it is
doubtful that acting officers rely solely on their salary for income
generation.168 Therefore, a much more venomous bite is required.
Acting officers should be precluded from participating in the stock
market for the duration of their tenure. And at the time they are
appointed, they should be required to place their investments and
substantial assets into a blind trust, just like a permanent
appointee would.169 Further, they should be required to file an
additional financial disclosure statement (OGE-450) within five
days of assuming office, and the Office of Government Ethics should
execute an ethics agreement.170 These requirements would allow the
DOJ,171 and the agency,172 to bring action directly against the acting

165 See Trump Can’t Run the Government with Temps, supra note 144 (“Banning acting
officials from drawing a salary . . . might do the trick.”).
166 See OFFICE OF PERS. & MGMT., Salary Table No. 2018-EX, https://www.opm.gov/policydata-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/pdf/2018/EX.pdf (last visited Oct. 13,
2019) (listing the executive schedule compensation scale).
167 Id.
168 See Jam Micheal McDonald, How Do People of Different Income Levels Invest?, RATE
HUB (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.ratehub.ca/blog/how-do-people-of-different-income-levelsinvest/ (“[I]nvestors with incomes of $75,000 or higher are far more likely to pick the stock
market to . . . [invest], compared to lower income groups . . . [who are] far more disposed to
savings accounts.”).
169 See JACK MASKELL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21656, THE USE OF BLIND TRUSTS
BY FEDERAL OFFICIALS 4 (2003) (citing 5 C.F.R. § 2634.605(c)(2)(iii)(B)) (“In the executive
review process, an ‘ethics agreement’ may be entered into whereby the official, to avoid ethical
and conflicts issues with respect to particular assets, agrees to certain remedial action,
including the transfer of assets to a qualified blind trust, as an alternative to divestiture or
to specific recusal or disqualification agreements.”).
170 See id. (noting that these precautions are required for PAS officers).
171 See 5 U.S.C. app. § 104(a)(1) (2007) (“The Attorney General may bring civil action . . . .”).
172 See
U.S.
OFFICE
OF
GOV’T
ETHICS,
https://www.oge.gov/web/278eguide.nsf/content/for+ethics+officials+document~1.06:+failure
+to+file+and+falsification+penalties (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (citing 5 U.S.C. app. § 104(c)
(2007); 5 C.F.R. § 2634.701(d)) (“An agency may take any appropriate action against
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officer if she or he failed to file or falsified the OGE-450, subjecting
the acting officer to civil and criminal penalties.173 By affecting the
finances of acting officers, these provisions would incentivize them
to step down at the end of the tolling period.
As an added incentive, and to thwart agency capture concerns,
acting officers should be precluded from accepting employment and
compensation from “covered private employers,” or regulated
entities of the agency, for a set time period. Such rules already exist
for government attorneys174 and procurement officials;175 this
proposal would merely extend the principle to acting officers. The
preclusion period would be multiplied by the amount of time the
acting officer remained past the tolling period.176 For example,
assume the base preclusion period to seeking or accepting
employment from a covered private employer is one year, and for
each month the acting officer remains an additional six months is
added to the period. Acting officer X, stays three months past the
tolling period. Therefore, X would be precluded from seeking or
obtaining employment from a covered private employer for two and
a half years.
I concede that removing some of these incentives might cause
potential acting officers to decline temporary appointments. For
government employees aspiring to move into Senior Executive
Service (SES) positions, however, the experience gained as an acting
officer could be vital because SES candidates “must demonstrate
that they have experience/competence in all five [Executive Core
Qualifications] (ECQs),”177 the second of which is leadership. And
employees who have not filed or who have filed a false, incomplete or late report . . . [and]
[a]gency action does not, however, preclude action by the Department of Justice.”).
173 See 5 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1)–(2)(B) (2007) (noting that the civil penalty amount can range
up to $50,000, and criminal penalties include fines and/or imprisonment for not more than
one year).
174 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.11(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (barring
government attorneys from representing private clients in connection with a matter in which
the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer).
175 See Procurement Integrity Act, 48 C.F.R. § 3.104–3(d) (2014) (restricting procurement
officials from receiving compensation from covered private contractors for a period of one
year).
176 The exact time periods are not of import here, but Congress could utilize a formula to
calculate the preclusion period on an individual basis, where b = base period, and y = number
of months served past the tolling period. Thus, resulting in an equation: b + 6 mo.(y) = total
preclusion period.
177 OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT.,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/seniorexecutive-service/faqs/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2019); see also OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT.,
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the increased salary, perks, and post-government employment
opportunities that accompany SES positions would likely entice
enough people to comply with my proposal.178
b. Broadening Standing, Relaxing Issue Exhaustion, and
Introducing a Quo Warranto Provision.
Disincentivizing acting officers from staying past the tolling
period may not be enough. Therefore, a second fang is needed to
complete the “FVRA with bite.” Because the primary enforcement
mechanism for the FVRA is through administrative proceedings
and litigation,179 more should be done to broaden standing, relax
issue exhaustion, and empower the public to bring FVRA challenges
through a quo warranto provision.
First, standing under the FVRA should be broadened. By further
defining nondelegable functions or duties to include “non-actions”180
and beneficial actions,181 Congress could rein in noncompliant
acting officers. This expansion of the definition would draw a firm
line in the sand, making anything stemming from a noncompliant
acting officer void ab initio. And combined with the salary
withdrawal provision, blind trust requirement, mandatory ethics
agreement, and private-employer preclusion provision, acting
officers may be more apt to resign their post because now there
would be little to no incentive to stay. Additionally, these changes
would enable regulated entities to bring suit even in cases where
beneficial or Pareto efficient actions were taken. With enough legal

GUIDE
TO
SENIOR
EXECUTIVE
SERVICE
QUALIFICATIONS
13
(2012),
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/senior-executive-service/referencematerials/guidetosesquals_2012.pdf (noting an example of how serving as an Acting Director
can meet the second ECQ: “Leading People”).
178 See OPM Reports on Why SES Members Leave Government, FEDWEEK (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://www.fedweek.com/issue-briefs/opm-reports-ses-members-leave-government/
(reporting that “[o]ver half of the departing [senior] executives indicated they would be
working for increased pay” and that 63 percent of those surveyed were planning on working
in non-government positions).
179 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
180 See supra Section II.B.2.
181 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. Given the difficulty of proving standing for
“beneficial acts,” Congress would likely need to mirror the False Claims Act (FCA) and amend
the FVRA to treat “beneficial acts” conducted by noncompliant acting officers as meeting the
requisite standing requirements. See Thomas R. Lee, Note, The Standing of Qui Tam Relators
Under the False Claims Act, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 543, 548 (1990) (describing how courts have
acknowledged “there [is] no constitutional prohibition to [a] realtor’s suing, under a statutory
grant of standing”).
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exposure, this might prompt the legislature,182 and media, to apply
additional pressure on the President to forcefully remove
noncompliant acting officers.
Second, issue exhaustion should be relaxed under the FVRA.
Under various statutes,183 where a regulated entity is required to
first adjudicate via an administrative proceeding and fails to timely
bring up an FVRA violation, that claim will be precluded if the suit
proceeds to judicial review—unless it can be justified by
extraordinary circumstances.184 For example, a defense claim of
ultra vires, which challenges the agency’s authority to act, would
qualify as an extraordinary circumstance.185 This strict
interpretation has allowed enforcement proceedings to continue
even where the acting officer was ultimately found to be
noncompliant, and his actions void ab initio, as was the case with
NLRB Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon.186 Such a result seems
an absurd waste of judicial resources. But challenges to the
exhaustion doctrine concerning FVRA claims have proven
unsuccessful in at least the Third and D.C. Circuits when the
agency had someone else who was eligible to bring the enforcement

182 See BRANNON, supra note 5, at 19–20 (citing Hearing on Lacking a Leader: Challenges
Facing the SSA After over 5 Years of Acting Commissioners, H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS
(Mar.
7,
2018),
https://waysandmeans.house.gov/event/hearing-lacking-leadershipchallenges-facing-ssa-5-years-acting-commissioners/) (noting that the Vacancies Act may be
enforced by the political process, and in March of 2018 resulted in a hearing for Acting SSA
Commissioner Nancy Berryhill—who stepped down as a result).
183 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2006) (“No objection that has not been urged before the
Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or
neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of ‘extraordinary circumstances.’”).
184 See, e.g., 1621 Route 22 W. Operating Co. v. NLRB, 825 F.3d 128, 140 (3d Cir. 2016)
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2012)) (“[I]f the Board was acting unlawfully in considering a
complaint brought by an improperly serving Acting General Counsel, its actions were no
more ultra vires than if the Board had misapplied the NLRA. We consider both sorts of claims
under the strictures of that statute, including the exhaustion bar of § 10(e). Again, that bar
permits consideration of arguments not raised before the Board only when late consideration
can be justified by ‘extraordinary circumstances.’”).
185 See Advanced Disposal Servs. E., Inc. v. NLRB, 820 F.3d 592, 600 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We
hold, therefore, that a challenge which goes to the composition of the NLRB, and thus
implicates its authority to act, constitutes an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ under § 160(e).”).
186 See Marquez Bros. Enters. v. NLRB, 650 F. App’x 25, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Because
petitioner's challenge is not ‘based on the agency's lack of authority to take any action at all,’
as was the case in SSC Mystic, but instead attacks the service of a single officer, our typical
NLRA exhaustion doctrine applies . . . .”). But Solomon was eventually held to be serving in
violation of the FVRA. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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action in place of the noncompliant officer.187 Therefore, it is
unlikely that a solution for this issue will come from the courts, nor
should it. If Congress is serious about protecting the separation of
powers, it has an opportunity to exempt claim exhaustion for FVRA
violations, either in organic acts or in the FVRA. This change would
allow courts to efficiently resolve judicial review of enforcement
actions much earlier and would again put pressure on agencies to
remove noncompliant acting officers because their enforcement
effectiveness would be jeopardized if an underlying FVRA violation
was present. At the very least, it would require enforcement actions
to be brought by a compliant officer.
Last, Congress should amend the FVRA to add a quo warranto
provision allowing private citizens and regulated entities to bring
suit for violations. Short of physically removing a noncompliant
acting officer, such a provision would serve as the proverbial last
line of defense. Litigants have already attempted to make quo
warranto arguments against some actings,188 and after all,
Congress’ intent was to empower litigants to monitor agency
compliance with the FVRA.189 A quo warranto provision would do
just that. With numerous states employing similar provisions, there
are ample examples to draw from.190 And such a provision is already
present in the D.C. Code.191
Congress could apply the D.C. Code to the FVRA, with some
slight alterations. First, the jurisdictional reach would need to be
broadened nationwide. Second, the U.S. Attorney in the district
where the noncompliant acting officer’s primary office is located

187 See United States v. Peters, No. 6:17-CR-55-REW-HAI-2, 2018 WL 6313534, at *5 (E.D.
Ky. Dec. 3, 2018) (holding that even if Acting Attorney General Mathew Whitaker’s
appointment violated the FVRA “no relief” could be granted because the prosecution of the
defendant was properly subdelegated to “a qualified United States Attorney”); see also cases
cited supra notes 184, 186.
188 See, e.g., Memorandum in Reply to Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction, English v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-02534-TJK (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2017),
ECF No. 44 (arguing that the plaintiff was limited to a quo warranto claim against Mick
Mulvaney).
189 See S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 19–20 (1998) (“The Committee expects that litigants with
standing to challenge purported agency actions taken in violation of these provisions will
raise noncompliance with this legislation in a judicial proceeding challenging the lawfulness
of the agency action.”).
190 See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 1-11 (2018) (discussing quo warranto proceedings).
191 See D.C. CODE §§ 16-3501–03 (1970) (providing for a quo warranto provision).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

33

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 [2019], Art. 7

330

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:297

would institute the proceeding, or on relation of a third person.192
This would remove the burden from the U.S. Attorney’s Office
(USAO) for the District of Columbia.
The appeal of a quo warranto provision embedded in the FVRA
is three-fold. First, it would force noncompliant acting officers to
appear in court to defend themselves. This outcome alone may force
them to step down. And even if they fail to appear, “the court may
proceed to hear proof . . . and render judgement accordingly.”193
Second, if the acting officer was found to be noncompliant with the
FVRA (i.e., guilty of “unlawfully hold[ing] or exercis[ing] an
office”),194 then she or he would be financially liable to the relator
for the costs of litigation and would have a court order ousting him
or her from office. Third, if the relator prevails, they could
subsequently sue for damages,195 providing an incentive for
plaintiff’s firms to represent entities and private parties with FVRA
claims where the USAO declines to institute proceedings.
For those concerned about a flood of litigation or frivolous suits,
the D.C. Code comes equipped with a stop gap measure. The relator
would be required to post a bond to cover the costs of litigation. If
the relator loses, she or he would be forced to incur the associated
costs.196 This puts the relator’s money where his or her mouth is.
Moreover, if the USAO declines to pursue the suit, the relator would
be required to petition the court to issue the writ.197 This process
creates a viable backstop for any frivolous claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
The FVRA was a modest step in the right direction, but it failed
to fix many of the chief concerns its drafters set out to correct.

192 Assistant U.S. Attorneys within the Affirmative Civil Enforcement (ACE) division who
specialize in similar qui tam suits would be well positioned to handle this type of litigation.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/civil-division (last visited Oct. 15,
2019) (discussing the responsibilities of ACE attorneys).
193 D.C. CODE § 16-3543 (1970).
194 Id. § 16-3545.
195 Id. § 16-3548.
196 See id. § 16-3502 (“The writ may not be issued . . . until the relator files a bond with
sufficient surety . . . conditioned on the payment by him of all costs incurred in the prosecution
of the writ if costs are not recovered from and paid by the defendant.”).
197 See id. § 16-3503 (“If the Attorney General or United States attorney refuses to institute
a quo warranto proceeding on the request of a person interested, the interested person may
apply to the court . . . to have the writ issued.”).
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Overtly complicated,198 riddled with ambiguities,199 and lacking
support due to sparse case law,200 it is no wonder that Presidents
are either confused by the Act or seek to manipulate it.201 But with
a growing conservative bench, more likely to employ a formalistic
view,202 the FVRA may soon be in jeopardy of being invalidated.
Such a result would prove disastrous, causing diminished agency
accountability, confusion, and increased agency inaction.203
The statutory reforms this Note proposes would give the FVRA a
fighting chance to survive a constitutional challenge and bring the
Act in line with the intent of its drafters. By removing the ability to
fill self-created vacancies, restricting and defining subdelegation of
duties, and giving the FVRA bite through meaningful enforcement
provisions, perhaps the FVRA will live on to serve its useful
purpose. The reforms proposed here neither constitute a
one-size-fits-all approach, nor close the other existing loopholes in
the FVRA.204 They also do not fully resolve the other elephant in the
room—Senate confirmation delays.205 But, by implementing the
changes I have proposed, the federal government would move one
step closer to a permanent solution to what should have been a
temporary problem.

198 See Kirby, supra note 7 (“The Vacancies Act is so complicated, that you go to the public
and people would be like, huh?”).
199 See Ogrysko, supra note 20 (noting the FVRA suit against VA Acting Secretary Robert
Wilkies “once again revives a series of so far unanswered questions about the Vacancy Act”).
200 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
202 See ANDREW NOLAN & CAITLAIN DEVEREAUX LEWIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45293,
JUDGE BRETT M. KAVANAUGH: HIS JURISPRUDENCE AND POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE SUPREME
COURT 104 (noting Justice Kavanaugh has applied a “general formalist approach toward
separation-of-power issues”); Jonathan H. Adler, What Do Justices Gorsuch and Justice
Breyer Have in Common?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jun. 22, 2018, 10:38 AM),
https://reason.com/volokh/2018/06/22/what-do-justices-gorsuch-and-justice-bre (noting that
Justice Gorsuch is a textualist, originalist, and formalist).
203 See O’Connell, supra note 51, at 938–46 (discussing the consequences of vacant offices).
204 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
205 See O’Connell Staffing, supra note 118 (discussing a trend of increasing Senate
confirmation delays).
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